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Humpty Dumpty was Wrong - Consistency in Meaning Matters:
Some Definitions of Privacy, Publicity, Secrecy and other Family
Members1
Gary T. Marx

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,
“it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so
many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master –
that’s all.”
- Lewis Carroll Through the Looking Glass

Humpty Dumpty was partially right. His words may mean what
he chooses to have them mean, but that is just his story. 2 There is
nothing inherent or eternal in the words (or what they represent).
Granted that he has the power to say what he means, but others have
the power to say what they mean, not to mention hearing what they
choose to hear. Alice is the more interesting of the two when she
wonders what the consequences are of making "words mean so many
different things." For the understanding of secrecy and related
phenomena those consequences are decidedly negative.
In the beginning there was the concept. And in beginning an
inquiry into surveillance (Marx 2015), I argue that the failure to
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adequately define and differentiate terms can cloud and contort ethical
and empirical understanding and lead to unnecessary conflict and
unwise policies. Consider surveillance and privacy, terms central to
understanding secrecy. What "are" they really? (Or better what do
people mean when they use the terms)?
In popular and academic dialogue surveillance is often wrongly
seen to be only the opposite of privacy—the former is seen as bad and
the latter good. For example, social psychologist Peter Kelvin (1973)
emphasized privacy as a nullification mechanism for surveillance. But
Kelvin’s assertion needs to be seen as only one of four basic empirical
connections between privacy and surveillance. Surveillance is not
necessarily the dark side of the social dimension of privacy. 3
Surveillance implies an agent who accesses personal data (whether
through discovery tools, rules, or physical and logistical settings).
Privacy, in contrast, involves a subject who can restrict access to
personal data through related means. But both can be connected in a
variety of ways.
Surveillance can obviously invade privacy—that’s what the fuss
is all about (e.g., the employee in a lab testing for AIDS who sold
information on positive results to a mortuary). Yet surveillance can
also be the means of protecting privacy (biometric identification and
audit trails, video cameras that film those with access to sensitive
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data). And privacy can also protect surveillance (undercover police
who use fake IDs and call forwarding to protect their identity) just as it
can nullify it (e.g., encryption, whispering, and disguises). Privacy for
whom and surveillance of whom and by whom and for what reasons
need to be specified.
Depending on how it is used, active surveillance can affect the
presence of privacy and/or publicity. As nouns, the latter can be seen
as polar ends of a continuum involving rules about withholding and
disclosing, and seeking or not seeking, information. Thus, depending
on the context and role played, individuals or groups may be required
to engage, find it optional to engage, or be prohibited from engaging
in these activities, whether as subjects or agents of surveillance and
communication
The rules applying to agents and subjects are in principle
independent. When the rules specify that a surveillance agent is not to
ask certain questions of (or about) a person and the subject has
discretion about what to reveal, we can speak of privacy norms. When
the rules specify that the subject must reveal the information or the
agent must seek it, we can speak of publicity norms (or, better
perhaps, disclosure norms). With publicity norms there is no right to
personal privacy that tells the agent not to seek information, or that
gives the subject discretion regarding revelation. Rather there is the
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reverse—the subject has an obligation to reveal and/or the agent to
discover.4

Private and Public as Adjectives
The moral expectations surrounding information as a normative
phenomenon (whether for protection or revelation and whether based
on law, policy, or custom) can be differentiated from the empirical
status of the information as known or unknown. To understand this
distinction, we need the related terms private and public—adjectives
that can tell us about the status of information. Is information known
or unknown; does it have an objective quality; can it be relatively
easily measured? For example, in face-to face-encounters one
generally knows the gender and face of a stranger, whether this is in
the street, an office, or a home. The information is “public,” as in
readily accessible, and this may be supported by antimask laws and
requirements to wear symbolic items of clothing, tattoos, or badges.
Absent such rules, the stranger’s political or religious beliefs are likely
to be invisible and unknown.
Of course, normative expectations of privacy and publicity do not
always correspond to how the adjectives public and private are applied
to empirical facts. Thus, the cell phone conversations of politicians and
celebrities that have privacy protections may become public.
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Information subjected to publicity requirements, such as government
and corporate reports and disclosure statements, may be withheld,
destroyed, or falsified. Information not entitled to privacy protections,
such as child or spouse abuse, may be unknown because of the
inaccessibility of the home to broader visibility. The distinction here
calls for empirical analysis of the variation in the fit between the rules
about information and what actually happens to it.
In consideration of the role of borders below, I note that privacy
and publicity can be thought of in literal and metaphorical spatial
terms involving invisibility and visibility and inaccessibility and
accessibility. The privacy offered by a closed door or a wall and that
offered by an encrypted e-mail message share information restriction,
even as they differ in many other ways. Internet forums are not
geographically localized but in their accessibility can be usefully
thought of as public places, not unlike the traditional public square,
where exchanges with others are possible or where others are visible,
as with an uncovered window.
Those who make claims about privacy would be more likely to
agree with one another, or at least be clearer in their arguments, if
they clarified whether they were talking about respect for the rules
protecting privacy or the empirical status of information as known or
not known.
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All concepts are of course limited, if not necessarily always
scandalous. Erving Goffman (1971). In writing of “relations in public”
and “public life,” attends to the elements and possibilities within the
immediacy of physical co-presence (that is in the presence of another
person). This is the strand of “publicness” as visibility. It suggests the
“public” as known to at least one other person rather than to any rules
about the status of information (that it must be revealed or concealed)
or to a legally defined place (such as private golf course). So he/we
can paradoxically speak of “public order in private places” (Goffman
1971, xiv)
Such visceral immediacy sets up a nice comparative issue as a
cousin of the distanced immediacy we have come to know—love and
hate—through the Internet, cell phone, and webcam. It also alerts us
to the neglected theme of private order and disorder (one form being
privacy violations) in public places. Erving Goffman captures the
former with his felicitous phrase civil inattention. For example, when
passing another person we do not know on the street, some minimal
glance is necessary in order not to collide and perhaps to acknowledge
the other’s presence. 5The other is “available” for a more indelicate
personal border crossing, but it does not occur. When it does occur,
whether as a result of staring, leering or inappropriate speech,
gestures or touch we have an instance of uncivil attention (Gardner
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1995)

Confidentiality and Secrecy
Surveillance takes place in the context of rules, expectations,
and practices regarding publicity and privacy. Privacy and publicity and
secrecy and confidentiality are inherently social terms. The terms
would be irrelevant to Robinson Crusoe when he thought he was alone
on the island. They are social in implying an “other” from whom
information is withheld or to whom it is communicated and who may,
or may not, be under equivalent expectations to reveal and conceal.
This section examines the interrelationships of rules regarding secrecy
and confidentiality and helps clarify their meaning.
Confidentiality refers to rules about how discovered information
is to be treated. It necessitates at least two parties and calls attention
to social interaction and the rules and expectations that enshroud it.
For confidentiality to be honored as a practical matter, a second party
must have obtained the information. For example, once a doctor
appropriately has personal information about a patient, the
information is no longer “private” from the doctor. We can’t speak of
the doctor’s invading the privacy of the patient through routine data
collection (assuming other unrelated borders are honored). We can
however speak of a violation of the rules of confidentiality if the doctor
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wrongly shares the information or does not adequately protect it.
The information can be viewed as a shared secret, even though
the prohibition on revelation (except under approved conditions)
applies only to the surveillance agent (the doctor). This contrasts with
settings where secrecy and revelation are reciprocal obligations, as
with nondisclosure clauses in some contractual relations or court
settlements.6 When the interests of the parties overlap, the
information is more likely to remain secret. 7
Some analysts draw a distinction between secrecy and privacy.
Privacy is used to mean shielding legitimate, non-stigmatizing
information, while secrecy “implies the concealment of something
which is negatively valued by the excluded audience and, in some
instances, by the perpetrator as well” (Warren and Laslett 1977). 8 This
definition of secrecy slaps a negative value on protected information.
Such information may also be positively valued or neutral. A broader
definition that does not start with the negative is needed.
To be sure, the nature and properties of any piece of information
suggest an important set of variables. As noted, this discussion is
particularly concerned with personal information, as against that about
organizations or the physical world. The kind of information withheld
by, revealed by, or taken from an individual is significant. Is it
stigmatizing, morally disvalued, disadvantageous; morally and socially
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neutral; or prestige enhancing, morally valued, and advantageous?
The organization and dynamics of information control (whether to
discover or communicate/publicize information or to block these) of
course will differ depending on the kind of information.
The motives and related goals for protecting, discovering, and
communicating personal information are certainly important. Thus, it is
useful to differentiate information that others do not know according to
the degree of intentionality found with the withholding and the relative
importance the individual places on controlling the information. When
the non-revelation of the secret is associated with “something to hide”
(either as stigma or non-stigmatizing information that would
disadvantage), we see greater intentionality than in situations where
the unavailability or withholding of information flows from a sense of
propriety or natural conditions such as limits on the senses.
By convention, the term secrecy often refers to organizational
data, while privacy refers to the data of individuals. Since
organizations do not generally have “rights” in the same sense that
individuals do, secrecy is a better term here than privacy. This may
involve legitimate organizational secrets, as with patent details and
strategic plans, or illegitimate organizational secrets, as with false
reporting and cover-ups. The rules around organizational information,
as with those around personal information, vary from mandatory
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disclosures to closures with a large discretionary middle area.

9

However, apart from legal meanings, many of the informationcontrol processes are the same regardless of whether we are dealing
with organizations or individuals. What is fundamental is the issue of
information control. There is no compelling reason to call the
protection of negative information secrecy and its opposite privacy.
Whether as noun, adjective, or verb, the meanings of secret and
secrecy overlap those of privacy and private. When personal privacy is
viewed as a right, it calls attention to the subject’s ability to control
the release of information. This does not mean it cannot be shared,
but that the individual has a choice. The Fifth Amendment, for
example, does not prohibit individuals from offering information or
confessing, it simply prohibits this from being coercively obtained.
In contrast, the rules applying to legitimate secrecy prohibit or
limit the subject from releasing information. This is often accompanied
by sanctions for violation. In principle, individuals and organizations
don’t have a choice about divulging information deemed to be secret
by formal rules. Thus, the broader terms protected and unprotected
information can be used to include both privacy and secrecy and their
opposites,10 whether this refers to the rules about the information or
its current empirical status.
Types of Privacy
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Privacy, like the weather, is much discussed, little understood,
and not easy to control. Like its family member surveillance, it is a
multidimensional concept with fluid and often ill-defined, contested,
and negotiated contours, dependent on the context and culture. The
scholarly effort to define privacy is a growth industry. Yet as welcome
as deductive conceptual efforts regarding the meaning of privacy are,
they must be approached deftly lest they end in reification and
nominalism gone wild. I prefer to begin with empirical topics that are
intellectually and socially compelling and to inductively generate
concepts from them.
For our purposes, the central factors are the rules and conditions
affecting data outputs from and inputs to the person. These rules and
conditions encounter and may create or overcome borders around the
person—whether natural or cultural. As noted, I use the term data or
information to broadly refer to various sensory phenomena that may
cross the borders of the person (whether leaving or entering) or
otherwise be associated with the person.
Contemporary concerns almost always involve some aspect of
informational privacy, a form early identified by Westin (1967). I don’t
wish to enter the debate over what privacy “really” is in some
essentialist pre-social sense. But I will note how a sociology-ofinformation approach connects to themes in the literature. Within
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informational privacy we find the conditions of anonymity and pseudoanonymity, often referred to as being necessary for another type of
privacy involving seclusion and being left alone. Personal borders are
obviously more difficult to cross if an individual cannot be reached via
name or location. The conditions around revelation or protection of
various aspects of identity are central to our topic.
Informational privacy encompasses physical privacy. The latter
can refer to insulation resulting from natural conditions such as walls,
darkness, distance, skin, clothes, and facial expression. These can
block or limit outputs and inputs. Bodily privacy is one form of this,
and its borders can be crossed by implanting something such as a chip
or birth control device or removing something, such as tissue, fluid, or
a bullet.11
A related and taken-for-granted form is aesthetic privacy (Rule
et al, 1983), which refers to the separation, usually by a physical
barrier of bedroom or bathroom, of activities involving one’s “private
parts” and unguarded moments. Alderman and Kennedy (1995)
discuss a number of such cases in which the shock of discovering a
violation surfaces norms of which we are hardly aware because they
are so rarely violated. Clothes and manners also sustain aesthetic
privacy. The concern over full-body airport scans also illustrates a
violation or breach of such norms.
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Informational privacy can be considered as it ties to institutional
setting (e.g., financial, educational, health, welfare, employment,
criminal justice, national security, voting, census); places and times;
the kind of data involved, such as about religion or health, apart from
the setting; participant roles (communications privacy as involving
two-party, one-party, or no-party consent); and aspects of technology,
such as wire or wireless, phone, computer, radio, or TV.
Considerations of setting, data type, and means are central to
legislation and regulation and rich in anomalies and cross-cultural
differences.
In emphasizing informational privacy, several other commonly
considered forms such as decisional (Decew 1997) or proprietary
(Allen 2007) privacy are slighted.12 Breaches of these forms primarily
involve application or use of private information, rather than
information discovery. Although it is distinct, informational privacy
shares with the other forms the key factor of control over access to the
person or at least the person’s data. These may be connected. Thus, if
individuals can control their personal information—whether not having
to reveal their purchase of birth control pills (when this was illegal) or
keeping paparazzi from taking pictures—then they need not worry
about that information’s being used.
Borders
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When you are heading for the border Lord
You’re bound to cross the line.
-

Kris Kristofferson, “Border Lord”
Much of human history can be read as a struggle involving the

access to and symbolism implied by various kinds of spatial and
metaphorical borders. The intersection and blurring of the borders of
personal information and technology under conditions of modernization
and globalization are central to the topic.13 When surveillance and
communication technology are controversial, it is often because of the
crossing, or the failure to cross, a personal border, or because border
definitions conflict.
Various borders may protect information: physical blockages
such as walls, a purse, or skin; kinds of places or organizations as
culturally defined, such as a home, a church, or a public park; kinds of
role relationships, such as professional and familial; and various
temporal forms, such as time after working hours, leisure time,
holidays, and amnesty periods.
Various images can be applied. We can think of borders around
the person as being like a bubble, clear, frosted, or opaque and
hermetically sealed or permeable—and for the last, whether permitting
outputs, inputs, or both. With the piercing abilities of the new
surveillance, speaking of the borderless person (or even organization
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss1/3
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or nation may become less of an oxymoron.
The idea of borders suggests a circumscribed entity (in this case,
the person) separate from its environment. Yet borders to varying
degrees permit exchanges or, as they say, “flows.” This quality alerts
us to the important and neglected issue regarding the directionality of
border crossings. Borders, like roads, are navigable in several
directions.
Technologies that cross personal borders can be differentiated
based on the direction of the crossing and data flow. These issues tie
to sociology-of-information questions regarding norms about
concealing and revealing information. Here violations may occur on the
part of both the surveillance agent and the person of interest, in either
failing to collect or offer information. An example of the former would
be an agent’s failure to collect vital information from expectant
mothers such as about drug use (Etzioni 1999) or inquiring about
arrest history for persons working with children. Examples of the latter
would be a subject’s failure to reveal such as a house seller concealing
a leaky roof or a person with a sexually transmitted disease not
informing a partner of this. Most academics and activists emphasize
the involuntary collecting of personal information by agents while
generally giving little attention to the failure to surveil or of subjects to
‘fess up.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2016

15

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2016], Art. 3

However, considerations of privacy need to focus on more than
only taking from the person or failing to do so or the failure to reveal.
Crossing a personal border to impose upon the person is of equal
importance in considerations of liberty and in the generation of a broad
and logical conceptual framework. Consider, for example, smells sent
through a heating or air-conditioning system intended to affect moods
or telephone solicitations, spam and regular junk mail or the
bombarding of messages in some supermarkets over the PA system or
written on the floor, shopping carts, and neon signs. Or consider
individuals who offer information inappropriately, as with public nudity,
loud music, or revelation of intimate life details to strangers.
Surveillance and Communication
The function of borders as either containing those within or rejecting
those outside (or both) is being changed by new surveillance and
communication technologies. The spread of sensors and their weaving
into data networks especially calls attention to the connections
between undifferentiated and differentiated forms of communication
and surveillance. These technologies may be mass or individually
based and involve extraction or imposition functions.
In most considerations of individual privacy, the emphasis is on
the extent to which the individual can, in principle and in actuality,
control data from flowing outward, such as that involving telephone or
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computer communication, credit card activity, social networks, beliefs
and feelings, location, facial appearance, or biometric data such as
DNA, voice print, heat, and scent. When such outputs are available,
the individual is a transmitter of data, and something is taken from or
willingly leaves the person.14 This transmission may happen in an
active or passive fashion and with or without the individual’s
knowledge and consent.
Much less attention is directed to the individual’s control over
information and stimuli flowing inward, such as sound, sight, smell,
touch, taste, and factors affecting the ability to act (the hard
engineering in or out of behavior potentials) and even “cookies” placed
on one’s computer by web sites visited. Here the individual is a
potential recipient of information and related inputs, opportunities, and
restrictions from outside. These in a sense enter rather than leave the
person, or at least the person’s environment.15
While we are often happy magnets for such exterior inputs,
much energy also goes into constructing and sustaining barriers to
unwanted communication forms, such as advertisements (the TV mute
button, DVR), spam, telemarketing, and junk mail (“do not contact”
lists, call restriction devices), outside noise (headsets), and wearing
hats, dark glasses, and even masks in public. Such inputs also extend
to the unwanted communication from loud cell phone users in public
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places. In such cases we see the desire to be left alone and for “space”
and distance, or at least insulation from others.
The same technology may of course offer outputs and inputs. 16
What surveillance takes from the individual can be joined with a
reverse flow of communication imposed upon the individual. The
telescreeen in George Orwell’s novel 1984 illustrates this. It
transmitted the person’s image and words to Big Brother, while
simultaneously broadcasting propaganda.
Foucault (1977) observed the move away from the spectacle of
irregular public executions as control mechanisms intended to instill
fear in the audience to softer punishment hidden and controlled within
institutions. The systematic use of supposedly scientific knowledge and
less visible surveillance were thought to be more effective and
humane. Yet with developments in mass communication and the
strengthening of the First Amendment, public access to information is
strong and may be getting stronger. We see not only the few watching
the many, but the many watching the few, sharing the same logic of
visibility intended to bring deterrence and accountability. The news
entertains and also brings morality tales and symbolic meanings
(Altheide 2002; Andrejevic 2007; Doyle 2003; Leman-Langlois 2002;
Mathiesen 1997). Entertainment in the form of sitcoms, music videos,
and video games brings the news and morality tales.
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In the year 1984, Jim Rule observed that with the development
of computing, mass surveillance became possible alongside mass
communication. In its indiscriminate sweep, the mass surveillance of
generalized computer matching (in which the two or more entire
databases are compared absent reason for specific suspicion) is
equivalent to the indiscriminate mass transmission of a TV or radio
signal.
Beyond being mass (broadly) directed, as with TV ads or video
cameras on roads, communication and surveillance may be focused
with varying degrees of specificity on individual subjects of interest, as
with targeted marketing and court-ordered wiretaps. This distinction
(mass or individual focus) is considered in Chapter 2 of my book
Window Into the Soul mentioned above.. Here let us simply note some
links and some blurring between the two.
We increasingly see tools such as video and computer
technologies that combine surveillance and communication functions
or blur the line between them. With this comes a move from mass to
more individualized communication determined by characteristics of
the recipient. Moreover, developments in the surveillance of
consumption have been a major boost to targeted forms of
communication.
Individualized (targeted or segmented) marketing
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communication often occurs as a result of some form of surveillance.
Calls to an 800 number, visits to a web page, or consumption behavior
can lead to spam or targeted solicitations via telephone and mail. Law
enforcement also uses mass communications such as advertisements
and mailed solicitations to identify potential offenders (those who
respond), who may then become subjects of stings and other forms of
surveillance.
Contemporary television and webcam transmissions also
combine or blur the line between surveillance and communication.
Consider live helicopter videos of car chases, as with O. J. Simpson, or
investigative TV programs that use infiltration and stings to uncover
consumer fraud and sexual predation. In these cases, the surveillance
function is seen as a means for the collection of evidence, as an aide
to apprehension of violators, and as an affirmation of cultural beliefs
about what happens to them. This line blurring is also seen with home
cable TV systems that beyond offering entertainment can monitor
viewer behavior for billing, marketing, and security. In the case of the
latter they can monitor for fire, gases, functioning of electrical and
other systems, unauthorized entry or motion, and internal images of
the home when an alarm is triggered.
The same tool of course may serve different functions for various
groups. Webcam transmissions such as those in bars or on beaches
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that offer images of swimmers and weather conditions also serve as
means of communication and control. Automobile radios deliver music
and emergency messages (the latter even if the radio is turned off),
and electronic location and engine monitoring devices can control
driving behavior while also offering safety warnings. Multifunction
handheld devices that offer radio and television can receive and
transmit personal messages and images, while also offering records of
location and communication usage.
In summary, communication and surveillance may be mass
(broadly) directed, as with TV ads and video cameras in a public
square. Or they may be individually focused with varying degrees of
specificity on subjects of interest, as with marketing to particular
demographic groups and air travel profiling. Technical and social
developments have strengthened both forms, the linkages between
them, and their merging.
Greater attention to the non-self evident meaning of the
common sense terms this article has discussed hardly guarantees wise
public policies with respect to the information control issues so central
to a democratic society, but it is surely a necessary condition.
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This article draws from Marx, Windows into the Soul: Surveillance and Society in an Age of
High Technology (2016c) and other works (2015; 2016a; 2016b).
With apologies to the immortal lines of the Dude in the film The Big Lebowski "that’s just like,
your opinion, man."
The noun surveillance and the verb to surveil are the same figures of speech as privacy and to
privatize. The latter, however, have their opposites in publicity and to publicize. But where are
the equivalent opposites for surveillance as a noun and a verb? In English there is no easy term
for the action which is the opposite of surveillance. The verb form to surveil suggests actively
surveying by an agent, just as the verb form to privatize suggests actively protecting (although
the more common usage involves property rights, as with privatization). While publicize is the
opposite of privatize, the best-worst term we have for a potential surveillance agent who
doesn’t act is that he or she demonstrates anti- or non-surveillance or perhaps un-observance.
The agent chooses not to act or to know (as with the proverbial three monkeys).
Marx (2011) analyzes the four types.
However sometimes the inattention is feigned as with the so-called brush pass in which two
people who appear to be simply brushing past each other are handing off spy material in the
best tradecraft tradition.
Contrast this with various other patterns, such as those of non-confidentiality, where both can
or must reveal, or where the surveillance subject also is expected not to reveal. The presence
or absence of reciprocity and prohibitions or prescriptions on discovering and reporting are
important variables in structuring and judging surveillance settings.
This suggests another typology of not only who the rules apply to, but of whether the interests
of the parties to the secret are shared or conflicting. Consider the secrecy sustaining elements
of those having affairs, involved in conspiracies, and the reluctant symbiosis of players in the
game of blackmail, as against situations where the parties have non-overlapping interests in
revelation and concealment.
For this view we can blame Georg Simmel: “The secret is . . . the sociological expression of
moral madness” (1950, 331). While Simmel is the classical theorist I would most like to meet if
had I to write about that for an SAT essay test, he missed it here. Marx and Muschert (2008)
and Coll (2012) argue for Simmel’s continuing relevance a century later, particularly with
respect to secrecy and information control, new forms of sociation and information as a new
medium of exchange.
Scheppele (1988) offers a useful conceptualization in noting secrets may be direct (A withholds
from B), serial (A shares the secret with B but withholds it from C) or collective (A and B
create a secret that they jointly withhold from C). For these three structures there are two
choices -- to tell or not to tell. This leads to six types of secret based on the parties involved
and whether the information is revealed or concealed ((disclosure, betrayal, leaks, simple
secrets, secondhand secrets, and conspiracy). A further distinction involves whether or not the
target of the secret suspects that there might be a secret. In that case we find shallow secrets.
Deep secrets refer to cases where the subject does not imagine that relevant information might
be had. Making such distinctions can improve the asking of research questions and judging the
morality of information concealing and revealing.
For the word private the opposite is public but what is it for secret (non-secret) and what does
the lack of an equivalent term imply?
The physical border perspective has limits too, thus taking or giving a urine or breath sample
or a photo involves using things that have already left the body and are different and beyond
the literal physical protective border of it. Garbage placed on the street in a protective
container is physically (although not impossibly) bordered as well, and in some jurisdictions is
also legally bordered.
Defining cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 11 (1973), involve decisional privacy with respect to personal and intimate matters such
as family planning, birth control, same-sex marriages, or physician-assisted suicide. Proprietary
privacy—use of a person’s information without consent for commercial and other purposes—
also involves control and liberty questions and the extension of market principles to symbolic
material that is often immaterial (at least physically). Drawing on, but going beyond these
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types, Jaap et al offers a comparative analysis of privacy that combines the two variables
(constitutional principles involving freedom from and freedom to and behavioral zones involving
the personal and the public to yield eight basic types of privacy (bodily, intellectual, spatial,
decisional, communicational, associational, proprietary, and behavioral privacy), with an
overlay of a ninth type (informational privacy) overlapping but not coinciding the others.
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754043
I
n Marx (1997, 2001, and 2005b) some blurred forms considered are space, distance,
darkness, time, and social and cultural orders.
The largest category is probably residual, in which there are no rules (although there may be
softer expectations). What is the ratio of rules that prohibit revelation, as with public nudity or
nursing, to those that mandate revelation, as with the obligation of sellers of a car or home to
come clean, and what are the ratios for prohibiting or requiring asking for information?
These distinctions can get hazy and be sequentially linked. Consider implants which enter the
person but can then send data back from the person under external or internal triggering as
with an RFID chip or bombarding a person with stimuli and then “reading” the response, as
with one of the MRI brain techniques.
Vance Packard was prescient here in writing about both taking information from and imposing
it upon the individual, although the dates (1964 and 1957) of his publications reverse this
logical sequence. Goals do not seem to have changed, even as the tools have changed.
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